Autor:
Antonio Ruiz Porras
Paginas: 36-764
Año: 2012
Volumen: Número: Lugar: ISSN:
Abstract: We develop a microeconomic model to explain why sanction policies used by developed
countries have had ambiguous effects to reduce drug trafficking in developing countries. In
the model, a country receives FDI depending on its government effort to reduce drug
exports. However, local drug producers lobby and offer contributions whose impact
depends on the level of government corruption. The government sets the level of
enforcement against drug trafficking taking into account the contributions paid and the
welfare of the local habitants. Analytically, we use the common agency theory to justify
and explain diverse sanction policy outcomes. We also show evidence about the
relationships among drug trafficking, corruption and FDI for some Latin-American
countries.
URL:
http://www.repositorioredgobmet.org.mx/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/2012-Ruiz-Porras-Tr%C3%A1fico-de-drogas-e-Inversi%C3%B3n.pdf